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FINE ART AND MORAL RIGHTS: THE
IMMORAL TRIUMPH OF EMOTIONALISM
Thomas J. Davis, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen the emergence of state constitutional bases for civil liberty protections.' As the federal judiciary has struggled with competing constitutional ideologies, state courts have increasingly relied on state constitutional provisions to provide the
basis for decision-making.2 This dramatic and arguably dynamic development has overshadowed an equally fascinating dichotomy in
federal-state relations: the development of state statutory protection
for the "moral rights" of creators of intellectual property. To date,
nine states have adopted what may loosely be termed limited moral
rights legislation.' These laws are limited both as to the class of
* B.A. Fordham University, 1978; J.D. University of Bridgeport, 1981; LL.M. (trade
regulation) New York University, 1988.
1. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707 (1983); Sedler, The State Constitutions and the
Supplemental Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL L. REv. 465 (1985); Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324
(1982).
2. States are free to provide more generous rights under their individual constitutions
than those afforded by the federal Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 75051, 653 P.2d 942, 947 (1982); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 449, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (1982).
See generally sources cited supra note 1. As Justice Brennan has stated:
[Sitate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections
of the Federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties. their protections often extended beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state
law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
Brennan, supra note I, at 491. A number of state courts have held, for example, that privacy
is a fundamental right protected by the state constitution. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d
494 (Alaska 1975); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981).
3. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 987, 989 (West Supp. 1989), discussed infra notes 60-87 and
accompanying text; 1988 Conn. Acts 284 (Reg. Sess.), discussed infra notes 118-34 and ac-
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works protected and the scope of protection provided. This Article
examines the various statutory schemes for the protection of artists'
moral rights," their shortcomings, 5 and the extent to which they are
preempted by federal copyright law.6 It concludes by noting the con-

fusion resulting from independently developing bodies of state and
federal law,7 a scheme unaltered by the ratification and implementation of the Berne Convention.$ Resolution of the competing statutory
claims of artists and copyright owners is essential if consistency and
predictability are to be maintained.9
II.

BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

At the outset, it is important to define the term "moral rights"
and to understand its place in American jurisprudence prior to the
recent increase in state legislative action. As the term is commonly
understood, "moral rights" refers to the creator's personal right to
control his creation.' 0 It encompasses the right to claim, or, under
appropriate circumstances, to disclaim authorship, and to prohibit
(some say control") physical alteration of the work.' Professor
companying text; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156 (West 1987), discussed infra notes
166-91 and accompanying text; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (1988), discussed infra
notes 263-78 and accompanying text; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp.
1988), discussed infra notes 88-117 and accompanying text; NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-I to 8 (West 1987), discussed infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text; N.Y. ARTS & CuLT. AFt.
LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1988), discussed infra notes 192-212 and accompanying text;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1988), discussed infra notes 135-65 and
accompanying text; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-1 to -6 (1987), discussed infra notes 238-62 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 52-278 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 337-76 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 279-336 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 337-76 and accompanying text.
8. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 1988 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2853, discussed infra notes 17-19, 45-47 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 337-78 and accompanying text.
10. Moral rights are usually referred to as personal rather than property rights. See,
e.g., Diamond, Legal Protectionfor the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators,68
TRADEMARK REP.244, 245 (1978). Property rights are pecuniary in nature and are protected
by federal copyright laws. See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985). The personal rights basis of moral rights is not
fully embraced by the state statutory schemes.
11. See Note, Moral Rights and the Compulsory License for Phonorecords,46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 67, 70 (1979) (authored by Madelaine Berg). "Control" presupposes an ability to
authorize alteration. Some of the new state statutes permit an artist to waive any right to
prohibit intentional physical alteration, mutilation, or defacement of a work of fine art. See,
e.g., infra note 87 and accompanying text (California); infra note 117 and accompanying text
(Massachusetts); infra note 122 and accompanying text (Connecticut); infra notes 147-49 and
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Nimmer provides a broad definition and identifies the author's moral
rights as the right:
to be known as the author of his work; to prevent others from being
named as the author of his work; to prevent others from falsely
attributing to him the authorship of work which he has not in fact
written; to prevent others from making deforming changes in his
work; to withdraw a published work from distribution if it no
longer represents the view of the author; and to prevent others from
using the work or the author's name in such a way as to reflect on
his professional standing.13
At least one commentator has asserted that the right to be free from
excessive criticism, to publish a reply to such criticism, and to be
protected from "a whole category of unpredictable injuries to .. .
honor and reputation" are distinct branches of an author's moral
rights protection. 4 These rights are said to flow from the expression
of the artist's personality in the work.1 5 They remain vested in the
creator even after transfer of ownership of the work and its copyright." The Berne Convention,' 7 to which the United States has now
assented, 18 expressly recognizes part of the moral rights concept.' 9
accompanying text (Pennsylvania). This ability to waive the statutory protections implies that
rights provided by the statute are intended to serve the interests of the artist, regardless of
actual or potential conflict between the artist's interest and broader social interests in the pres-

ervation of fine art.
12. See DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. I, 5 (1980);
Diamond, supra note 10, at 245; Hauhart, Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of
Droit Moral, 30 CATH. LAW. 53, 56 (1985); Merryman, The Refrigeratorand Bernard Buffet,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1027-28 (1976); Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in
the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators,53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 558 (1940); Strauss, The
Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506, 507-08 (1955).
13. 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
LITERARY. MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 8.21 [A], at
8-247 (1987).
14. See Roeder, supra note 12, at 573.
15. See Davis, State Moral Rights Law and the Federal Copyright System, 4 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT L.J 233, 234 (1985); Marcus, The Moral Right of the Artist in Germany, 25
COPYRIGHT L.SYMP. (ASCAP) 93, 94-95 (1980); Merryman, supra note 12, at 1025, 1027.
16. See, e.g., 1957 Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise 2723, art. 32, reprinted
in I UNESCO & WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1984) (France,
Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, Mar. 11, 1957) (codifying the artist's
"right of withdrawal," one component of the French doctrine of moral right).
17. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
reprinted in 3 UNESCO & WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1984)
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
18. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L, No. 100-568, 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG & ADMIN NEWS (102 Stat.) 2853. Until 1988, the United States had resisted
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Recognition of artists' moral rights is usually urged on two distinct grounds. The first is that the failure to attribute authorship, the

false attribution of authorship, or the alteration of a work may interfere with a creator's ability to market his reputation and talent.20

This is a purely economic argument, grounded in the adverse impact
on the creator's ability to fully exploit the monetary reward of creativity.2 The second is that interference with moral rights is offensive

to the artist and constitutes an insult to his person. 2
These concepts of moral rights find no express provision in federal copyright law.23 Federal protection of "copyrightable" subject
efforts to ratify the Berne Convention. One of the several forces blocking ratification was the
controversy over the Convention's moral right provision. It had long been a concern that the
absence of federally legislated moral rights precluded United States adherence to the Convention. See generally Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 547-58 (1986) (reporting on the degree of
compatibility between United States copyright law and the moral rights provision of the Berne
Convention). However, in enacting the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2853, Congress implicitly
asserted that § 106 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and
state common law remedies provide sufficient moral rights protection to bring the United
States within the terms of the Convention. The Act provides that all "obligations of the United
States in adhering to the Berne Convention" are satisfied by the Act, id. § 2(3), 1988 US
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) at 2853, and that the existing mix of federal, state,
and common law affecting moral rights is not "expand[ed] or reduced]" by United States
adherence to the Convention, id. § 3(b), 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN, NEWS (102 Stat.)
at 2853.
19. See Berne Convention, supra note 17, at art. 6bis. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragragh
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights,
and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation
of the country where protection is claimed ....
Id. (as revised in Paris on July 24, 1971).
20. See Roeder, supra note 12, at 557.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 558-74; Strauss, supra note 12, at 508-17.
23. The exception is the limited moral right offered the composer in tandem with the
compulsory license provisions for sound recordings. Section 115(e) of the Copyright Act gives
a musical composer the exclusive right to entirely prohibit the initial mechanical reproduction
of his or her copyrighted compositition. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(e) (1982). Once a composer
allows another to mechanically reproduce his work, however, anyone can make "similar use"
of it with certain procedural formalities. See id. Thus, artists rearranging a copyrighted composition have only limited freedom to experiment with the material, and these limits are
grounded in a crude recognition of moral rights. See Note, supra note 11, at 76.
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matter has always been tied to a system which creates and promotes
economically exploitable rights.2 4 This tendency flows directly from
the language of the Constitution providing that "Congress shall have
power ...

[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by

securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 The Framers

recognized that the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge
and information was fundamental to the material and spiritual advance of society and chose to promote that development by rewarding individual incentive.2 6 In Mazer v. Stein,2" the Supreme

Court concluded that "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant ...

copyrights is the conviction that

encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors ....
29
More recently, in Goldstein v. California,
the Supreme Court reiterated the economic philosophy behind the Copyright Clause as
describing "both the objective which Congress may seek and the

means to achieve it. The objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts. . . To accomplish its purpose, Congress may

grant to authors the exclusive right to the fruits of their respective
works.""0
The Framers' use of the phrase "to promote the Progress of Sci24. Kwall, supra note 10, at 2. Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides exclusive rights to do or authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
25. US CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 267
(J. Madison) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1902) (stating that "[t]he copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions
seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both
individuals.").
27. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
28. Id.at 219.
29. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
30. Id. at 555 (footnote omitted).
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ence and useful Arts" suggests a nobler purpose than the enrichment
of creative individuals. The emphasis on commercial benefit was intended to serve the broad social interest in the development of art,
literature, and useful things."1 That society's benefit is the primary

concern is clear from the Court's statement in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios32 that "[t]he monopoly privileges
that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be

achieved." 3 3 It has also been asserted that the concept of copyright
"is designed to secure, not to surmount, the public's interest" by encouraging creation and dissemination.34
Accordingly, protection for the so-called "moral rights"3 5 has
been left to various state common law theories,36 including the right
of privacy,37 the right of publicity,3" defamation,3 9 unfair competition, 40 and contract. 1 Within limited contexts, federal courts have

31. The Patent and Copyright Clause, reflecting common 18th century usage, employed
the term "useful Arts" to refer to those areas governed by patent law, and "Science" to refer
to those areas governed by copyright law. See I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 13, §
1.03[A], at 1-31 n.1.
32. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
33. Id. at 429.
34. Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 1490, 1494 (1979).
35. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text. Diamond discusses the derivation of
the term moral rights from the French "droit moral," and notes that Dr. Stephen P. Ladas
suggested that a more appropriate term is the German "urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht," meaning "right of the author's personality." See Diamond, supra note 12, at 244.
36. But see Note, supra note 34, at 1501-06 (arguing that the federal Copyright Act of
1976 "creates a limited federal basis of rights in artistic reputation").
37. See Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305, 309 (D.D.C. 1948) (finding that
the right of privacy is violated by the unauthorized publication of one's photograph). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (discussing the
development of the common law privacy right concept during the 19th century).
38. See Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (expressly recognizing the right of publicity), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See
generally Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 203, 215 (1954)
(examining the scope and limitations of the right of publicity and judicial recognition of that
right).
39. See Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 190, 168 N.E.2d 643, 645,
203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 815 (1960) (recognizing a cause of action in libel for publication of a
revised edition of an author's book with the author's name on the title page where the author
had not written the revised edition and when the revised edition contained errors).
40. Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939) (recognizing that the equitable doctrine of unfair competition is violated by a radio station's unauthorized broadcast of a skit which misappropriated the principal characters of the plaintiff's
novel in a manner injurious to the plaintiff's reputation). The doctrine of unfair competition
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recognized some statutory rights to prevent distortion or mutilation

of one's work.42 For various reasons, however, the common law remedies have been criticized as inadequate and too narrow to protect the

values embodied in the concept of moral rights.4 3 Proposals for a
federal moral rights bill have been introduced on several occasions,"
but none have ever reached the floor of Congress for a vote. Recently, Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988. 45 Although Berne has a broad moral rights provision,46 the
Implementation Act provides that an author's right under federal,
state, and common law to claim authorship or object to any distortion, mutilation, modification, or other derogatory action with reembodies the "passing off" theory, where the defendant sells its own goods as those of the
plaintiff, see American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), and
the "misappropriation" theory, where the defendant misappropriates rather than misrepresents
the plaintiff's goods, see International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
41. See Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1325-26 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that the publisher breached its contract with the author by publishing a revised edition of
the author's book under circumstances which violated their agreement).
42. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Gilliam recognized a cause
of action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), for mutilation or
other changes sufficient to constitute a false designation of source, so long as the work is introduced into interstate commerce. 538 F. Supp. at 24-25. To the extent the Gilliam court held
that the modification infringed the plaintiff's copyright, it did so on the basis of the exclusive
right to create a derivative work, not on moral rights grounds. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 19-20.
43. See Nimmer, supra note 38, at 204-18; Roeder, supra note 12, at 554; Note, supra
note 34, at 1496-1500; see also Note, Moral Right Protections in the Colorization of Black
and White Motion Pictures: A Black and White Issue, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 503, 517-36
(1988) (authored by Daniel McKendree Sessa) (arguing that the right of publicity and the
doctrine of unfair competition provide insufficient moral right protections to vindicate the integrity of black and white films and protect them from colorization).
44. See, e.g., H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). H.R. 1521 provided, in relevant
part:
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Visual Artist's Moral Rights Amendment of 1983".
Sec. 2. Section 113 of Public Law 94-553 (90 Stat. 2541) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(d) Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the author or the author's legal representative shall have the right, during the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death, to claim authorship of such work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other alteration
thereof, and to enforce any other limitation recorded in the Copyright Office that
would prevent prejudice to the author's honor or reputation.".
Id.
45. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 2853.
46. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing article 6bis of the Berne
Convention).
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spect to his work is not expanded or reduced. 7
Nevertheless, American copyright law provides the true
"moral" foundation of American intellectual property protections.
As noted by Roeder, "The very basis of all creative work lies in the
protection of the right to create, which is a function of the right of
individual liberty .... By and large,... modern liberal social philos-

ophy and jurisprudence support the view that one of man's basic
rights is the freedom to create. '48 The failure of Congress to act
with respect to artists' moral rights may thus reflect its collective
conclusion that current federal law contains sufficient protection by
providing that such rights are divisible and exploitable through contract.49 Congress may also have felt constrained by a concern that
the delicate balance between copyright, the first amendment, and the
doctrine of fair use would have been affected in unforeseen and unpredictable ways by the adoption of a moral rights amendment.
Whatever the forces checking Congress, nine states, encompassing
approximately one-third of the nation's population, 50 have been motivated to adopt some form of moral rights legislation affecting works
51
of fine art.
This development, while commendable in the abstract, threatens
to undermine the critical distinction between the rights of a creator
and the public's interest in the creation. The state statutes are uniformly intended to preserve the integrity of works of fine art and
provide the artist with an assurance of recognition for his work regardless of who owns the copyright. However, this legislative concern
with the integrity and reputation of artists has created statutory
schemes that subordinate the public's interest in its cultural heritage
to the interests and control of the individual artist without adequate
justification or safeguard.
47. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 3(b),
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2853, 2853.
48.

Roeder, supra note 12, at 558.

49. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
50. See

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

US.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF

THE UNITED STATES 1988, at 18 (108th el. 1987). The population of California, Connecticut,

Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island is
approximately 75,579,000. More importantly, there exists a northeastern regional moral rights
group of contiguous states-Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
51.

See statutes cited supra note 3.
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III.

INDIVIDUAL STATE ANALYSIS

Before launching into an examination of the various state laws,
certain threshold concepts must be understood. The statutes do not
protect all creations or even all copyrightable subject matter.52 They
are universally limited in applicability to works of fine art and generally exclude from protection works created by employees within the
scope of their employment or prepared under a contract for various
kinds of commercial use. 53 Each statute provides an artist with the
right to claim paternity of his work, and with the exception of Connecticut, to disclaim authorship in appropriate circumstances.54
State moral rights statutes are generally of two broad types.
First, there are those which prohibit intentional and, in some circumstances, grossly negligent acts of physical defacement, alteration,
mutilation, or destruction of works of fine art.5 Second, there are
those which under certain circumstances prohibit the public display
of fine art in a mutilated, altered, or modified form.5 6 Generally, the
52. Section 102(a) provides, in part:
Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
53. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (California); infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (Massachusetts); infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (Connecticut); infra
note 138 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania); infra note 184 and accompanying text (Louisiana); infra note 208 and accompanying text (New York); infra note 217 and accompanying
text (New Jersey); infra note 243 and accompanying text (Rhode Island); infra note 271 and
accompanying text (Maine).
54. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (California); infra note 105 and accompanying text (Massachusetts); infra note 124 and accompanying text (Connecticut); infra notes
152-53 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania); infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text
(Louisiana); infra note 201 and accompanying text (New York); infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (New Jersey); infra note 250 and accompanying text (Rhode Island); infra
note 269 and accompanying text (Maine).
55. See infra notes 60-87 and accompanying text (California statute); infra notes 88117 and accompanying text (Massachusetts statute); infra notes 118-34 and accompanying
text (Connecticut statute).
56. See infra notes 135-65 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania statute); infra notes
166-91 and accompanying text (Louisiana statute); infra notes 192-212 and accompanying
text (New York statute); infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text (New Jersey statute);
infra notes 238-62 and accompanying text (Rhode Island statute); infra notes 263-78 and
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former impose a recognized quality standard in their definition of
fine art while the latter do not. 7 Finally, as a general principal,
those states prohibiting the physical act of defacement, alteration,
mutilation, or destruction of fine art express a policy objective of
protecting both the reputation and professional careers of artists and
the public's interest in the preservation of its cultural heritage em-

bodied in fine art.58 Those states which prohibit the public display of
mutilated, altered, or modified fine art express a policy objective of
protecting the artist's reputation and professional career but most do
not, at least expressly, recognize any broader public interest in preserving the artistic work."
While these generalizations are a useful method for describing
the thrust of the statutes, they are inadequate for a thorough understanding of state moral rights legislation. What follows is a state by
state breakdown of the statutes.
A.

California

Under California law, a work of fine art is limited to "an original painting, sculpture or drawing, or an original work of art in
glass, of recognized quality."8 0 The statute excludes "work prepared
accompanying text (Maine statute).
57. The California and Massachusetts statutes prohibit the intentional physical defacement, alteration, mutilation, or destruction of works of fine art and incorporate a "recognized
quality" standard in their definition of fine art. See infra note 60 and accompanying text
(California); infra note 89 and accompanying text (Massachusetts). But see infra note 118
and accompanying text (noting that the Connecticut statute's definition of fine art does not
apply a "recognized quality" standard even though the statute prohibits intentional physical
alteration). Alternatively, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Maine prohibit the public display of fine art in a mutilated, altered, or modified form and do not incorporate a "recognized quality" standard. See infra note 193 and accompanying text (New York); infra note
213 and accompanying text (New Jersey); infra note 242 and accompanying text (Rhode Island); infra note 263 and accompanying text (Maine). But see infra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that Pennsylvania has adopted a public display statute that incorporates a
"recognized quality" standard); infra note 167 and accompanying text (same for Louisiana).
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
231, § 85S(a) (West Supp. 1988).
59. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of injury
to the artist's reputation under the Louisiana statute); infra note 200 and accompanying text
(same under the New York statute); infra note 219 and accompanying text (same under the
New Jersey statute); infra note 266 and accompanying text (same under the Maine statute).
But see infra note 248 and accompanying text (stating that there is no requirement of injury
to the artist's reputation in Rhode Island); infra text accompanying note 362 (setting forth the
preamble to the Pennsylvania statute which recognizes, both protection of the artist's reputation and preservation of the public welfare as the purposes of the statute).
60. CAL CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
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under contract for commercial use by its purchaser."61 The critical
issue is the determination of "recognized quality.

' 62

In making that

determination, the statute provides that "the trier of fact shall rely
on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators
of art museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art."'63 Once a work may be classified as fine art, no
one except the artist who created, owns, and possesses the work
"shall intentionally commit, or authorize . .. any physical deface-

ment, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of [the work]. '"6 Additional provision is made for persons who frame, 5 restore,66 or conserve 67 such works; the proper exercise of their functions will
presumptively not be interpreted as a physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction within the statutory meaning of those
terms. 8 Liability may result, however, when those functions are performed in a grossly negligent manner.69
The statute's prohibitions do not apply to works of fine art that
"cannot be removed from a building without substantial physical defacement, mutilation, alteration or destruction.1 70 This provision
seems to be directed to works of fine art located within a building.
Notwithstanding this exception, however, the rights and duties of the
artist may be reserved by an instrument signed by the owner of the
61. Id. "Commercial use" is defined as "fine art created under a work for hire arrangement for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or other printed and electronic media." Id.
§ 987(b)(7); see also Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637,
644, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1984) (holding that architects' plans, while arguably a "drawing" within the definition of fine art, are nonetheless excluded when they were prepared for
commercial use by the buyer).
62. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(f) (West Supp. 1989).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 987(c)(1).
65. Id. § 987(b)(4).
66. Id. § 987(b)(5).
67. Id. § 987(b)(6).
68. Id. § 987(c)(2).
69. Id. "Gross negligence" is defined as "exercise of so slight a degree of care as to
justify the belief that there was an indifference to the particular work of fine art." Id.
70. Id. § 987(h)(1). Section 989 does, however, contain special provisions concerning
works of fine art "of substantial public interest" which are located in or form a part of a
building and cannot be removed without physical damage. See id. § 989(e). The statute provides for notice to the artist before the work is removed. Id. § 989(e)(2)(A) (incorporating the
notice provisions of § 987(h)). In the absence of action by the artist (who may remove or pay
for the removal of the work and thereby acquire title), standing to represent the public interest
is bestowed upon non-profit entities who may attempt to obtain injunctive relief "to preserve
the integrity of the work of fine art ...." Id. § 989(e)(1).
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building and properly recorded.7 1 Once the instrument is properly
recorded it "shall be binding on all subsequent owners of such building. '72 In the event the fine art is a part of a building and cannot be
removed without substantial harm, the prohibition on physical defacement and other alteration does not apply so long as the building
owner diligently attempts without success to provide notice to the
artist or, having provided notice, the artist fails to remove or pay for
the removal of the work.7 3 Furthermore, if the removal is paid for by
the artist, "title to such fine art shall pass to [him].'
It should be
noted that the entire provision concerning "fine art which is a part of
such building" 75 comes into force only if the owner of the building
intends to cause or permit the physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of the work in the course of or after its
removal.7
California further provides that an artist may at any time
"claim authorship, or, for just and valid reason ... disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art."' 77 The statute does not provide
any guidance as to what circumstances constitute just and valid
reason.
In order to "effectuate the rights created" by the statute,7 8 the
artist, or "his heir, legatee or personal representative" if he is deceased,7 9 may commence an action for injunctive relief, 80 actual
damages, 81 punitive damages,82 reasonable attorneys' and expert wit71.

Id. § 987(h)(1).

72.

Id.

73. Id. § 987(h)(2).
74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id. § 987(c), (h)(2). The provisions dealing with unavoidable damage in the removal
of fine art from buildings are predicated upon that damage being "substantial," a condition
not applicable to any other prohibition of intentional physical defacement, mutilation, or
alteration.
77. Id. § 987(d).
78. Id. § 987(e).
79. Id. § 987(g)(1).
80. Id. § 987(e)(I).
81. Id. § 987(e)(2).
82. Id. § 987(e)(3). Any punitive damages assessed are to be awarded by the court in its
discretion to one or more "organizations engaged in charitable or educational activities involving the fine arts in California." Id. This provision may itself precipitate a debate between
potential recipients of the punitive damages over the issue of what activities involve "fine art."
Nor is it clear how that determination is to be made since the statutory scheme for determining "recognized quality" applies solely to the work of the artist who files suit. See id. § 987(f).
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ness fees,83 and any other relief the court may deem proper.84 All
rights created under the statute run for the life of the artist plus fifty
years.85 The statute of limitations is three years from the act complained of or one year from discovery, whichever is longer.86 The
statute also provides, in what is arguably its most controversial provision, that any rights and duties created under the statute may be
waived by a written instrument signed by the artist.8 "
B.

Massachusetts

A work of fine art under the Massachusetts statute is defined
more broadly than in California, although the "recognized quality"
standard is retained." The definition provides that "any original
work of visual or graphic art of any media

. . .

or any combination

thereof, of recognized quality" shall constitute a work of fine art.89
The statute provides several examples, "includ[ing], but not limited
to, any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft object, photograph,
."9 While works created
audio or video tape, film [or] hologram ....

by employees within the scope of their employment are excluded 91 no
mention is made, as in California, of works created under a contract
for commercial or trade use. 92 As in California, the critical issue of
the determination of recognized quality is left to a case by case analysis. 93 The statute directs that the court shall rely on the opinions of
a similar body of experts encountered in the California statute. 94 The
fundamental difference between the two states is Massachusetts' in83.
84.
85.

Id. § 987(e)(4).
Id. § 987(e)(5).
Id. § 987(g)(1).

86. Id. § 987(i).
87. Id. § 987(g)(3). But cf.id.§ 987(h)(1) (providing that if a work of fine art is part of
a building and cannot be removed without substantial harm to the work, the artist's rights
under the statute are deemed waived unless expressly reserved in an instrument signed by the
building owner).
88. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1988); see also supra
note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of fine art in the California statute).
89. MAss. GEN, LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1988).

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
93. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(f) (West Supp. 1988); see also supra
note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the determination of "recognized quality" under
the California statute).
94. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(f) (West Supp. 1988); see supra note 63 and
accompanying text (discussing the experts referred to by the California statute).
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clusion of any original works of "visual or graphic art in any me' whereas California strictly limits the media which it will
dia," 95
recognize."'
Similar to California, no one but the artist who owns or possesses a work of fine art that he has created may intentionally deface, mutilate, alter, or destroy it.97 "Intentional" is defined to include "action taken deliberately or through gross negligence," 98 the
latter of which itself is defined as the "exercise of so slight a degree
of care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the
particular work of fine art." 99 California, however, limits the application of the gross negligence standard to cases involving framers,
restorers, and conservers.' 00 No such limitation can be found in the
Massachusetts statute.
Massachusetts has a provision virtually identical to that of California with respect to the removal of fine art from a building when
substantial harm to the work cannot be avoided. 10' Generally, the
prohibitions on intentional physical defacement, alteration, mutilation, or destruction created under the statute do not apply unless the
building owner signs an instrument providing otherwise and the instrument is properly recorded, all prior to the installation of the art
in the building. 0 2 Once recorded, the instrument is binding on all
subsequent owners of the building. 03 Thus, the same provisions as
those discussed in California apply with respect to fine art which is a
part of any building and cannot be removed without substantial
harm. 10
Artists are granted "the right to claim and receive credit ... or,
95. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (West Supp. 1988).
96. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
97. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(c) (West Supp. 1988); cf. supra note
64 and accompanying text (discussing the California statute requirement that the artist create,
own, and possess the work of fine art before he may authorize any alteration).
98. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(c) (West Supp. 1988).
99. Id. § 85S(b).

100. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
101. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(h)(1) (West Supp. 1988); see supra notes
70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous California provision). As in California,
these provisions deal only with unavoidable "substantial" physical injury to the work of fine art
located in or forming a part of a building. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(h)(1), (2)
(West Supp. 1988); see supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous
California provision).
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §85S(h)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous California

provision).
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for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of [their] work[s] of
fine art."' 5 Such credit will depend on the medium used and the
nature and extent of the artist's contributions to the work.' 06 As is
the situation in California, 10 7 no provision is made for determining
what constitutes a "just and valid reason" to disclaim ownership.
The statute provides that an artist or his authorized representa°8
tive may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief, 09 actual damages, 1 0 reasonable attorneys' and expert witness fees and
all other costs of the action,"' or any other relief which the court
may deem proper."' There is no provision for punitive damages. The
statute, however, expressly dispenses with a showing of actual damages, special damages, or general damages as a prerequisite to a
suit."13 Of particular interest is a provision that the state attorney
is
general may commence an action for injunctive relief if the artist
4
view."
public
in
is
art
fine
of
work
particular
the
deceased and
The rights created have a duration of the artist's life plus fifty
years." 5 The statute of limitations is two years from accrual of the
cause of action or one year from discovery, whichever is later." 6 Finally, as in California, the artist may waive any and all of the rights
he acquires under the statute so long as he does so in a signed writing specifically referring to and identifying the work." 7
C. Connecticut
Connecticut's definition of fine art includes an array of specific
media." 8 However, in a striking departure from other states, ConMASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(d) (West Supp. 1988).
106. Id.
107. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
108. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(e) (West Supp. 1988). The statute is
unique in that it permits the artist to authorize "any bona fide union or other artists' organization" to commence suit in his stead. Id.
109. Id. § 85S(e)(3)(i).
110. Id. § 85S(e)(3)(ii).
111. Id. § 85S(e)(3)(iii).
112. Id. § 85S(e)(3)(iv).
113. Id. § 85S(e).
114. Id. § 85S(g). "Public view" is defined to mean "on the exterior of a public owned
building, or in an interior area of a public building." Id. § 85S(b).
105.

115. Id. § 85S(g).
116. Id. ch. 260, § 2C.
117. Id. ch. 231, § 85S(g); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing
the waiver provision of the California statute).
118. See 1988 Conn. Acts 284, § 1(2) (Reg. Sess.). "Works of fine art" include:
any drawing; painting; sculpture; mosaic; photograph; work of calligraphy; work of
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necticut does not limit fine art to original works of authorship. Accordingly, the Connecticut statute may apply with equal force to
"knock-offs," unauthorized derivative works, and originals.11 9 Works
prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment duties
are excluded from the definition of fine art.120 Commissioned works
prepared under contract for trade or advertising use are protected
unless the artist, prior to creating the work, executes a written
waiver of his right to prevent alteration.1 21 This provision is distinct
from the general waiver provision which permits waiver of rights
under the statute by22written instrument without regard to when the
waiver is executed.
The basic provisions of the statute prohibit the intentional commission or authorization of the intentional commission of "any physical defacement or alteration of a work of fine art." ' The right to
claim authorship is provided for,124 but there appears no right to disclaim authorship. Artists may commence actions for injunctive relief, 125 actual damages, 126 reasonable attorneys' and expert witness
fees, 2 7 and any other relief deemed proper by the court.12 8 There is
no provision for punitive damages.
Fine art which cannot be removed from a building without
"substantial physical defacement or alteration" is not protected by
the statute unless an instrument, executed and witnessed in the same
manner as a deed, reserves the rights set forth in the statute.' If
properly recorded, such an instrument is binding on the building
owner and all subsequent owners.' 30 Unlike the California statute,
graphic art, including any etching, lithograph, offset print, silkscreen or other work
of graphic art; craftwork in clay, textile, fiber, metal, plastic or other material; art

work in mixed media, including any collage, assemblage or other work combining
any of ...said media with other media; or a master from which copies of an artistic
work can be made, such as a mold or a photographic negative, with a market value
of at least two thousand five hundred dollars ....

Id.
119.
120.

This may have an ironic impact on federal preemption issues. See infra note 295.
1988 Conn. Acts 284, § 1(2)(B) (Reg. Sess.).

121.

Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. § 5(3).
Id. § 2.
See id. § 3.
Id. § 4(1).
Id. § 4(2).
Id. § 4(3).
Id. § 4(4).
Id. § 6.
Id.

§ 1(2)(A).
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in the statute concerning art restorers, framers,
there is no provision
3
or conservers.1

1

The rights provided in the statute "exist until the fiftieth anniversary of the death of [the] artist."' 2 The statute of limitations is
three years from the act complained of or one year after discovery, 3'
be commenced more than ten years
but in no event may an action
34
after the act complained of.'
D. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania statute tracks the Massachusetts statute in its
definition of "fine art."' 3 5 Original works "of recognized quality created using any medium" are included within the definition. 36 As in
Massachusetts, non-limiting examples of various medium are set
forth. 37 As in California, a work "created under contract for advertising or commercial use" is excluded.'38 However, unlike California,
the parties are free to provide otherwise in their written agreement. ' 9 The problem of determining recognized quality is dealt with
by directing the trier of fact to rely on the same cavalcade of experts
40
set forth in both the California and Massachusetts statutes.
The basic prohibition, as in both California and Massachusetts,
is the intentional physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or de131.

See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing the California provision).

132.

1988 Conn. Acts 284, § 5(1) (Reg. Sess.). After the artist's death, actions under

the statute may be commenced by the artist's heir, legatee, or designated personal representative. Id.
133. Id. § 7.
134. Id.

135. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra notes 8890 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "fine art" contained in the Massachusetts statute).
136. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
137. See id.; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the examples
provided by the Massachusetts statute). The examples include, but are not limited to, painting,

drawing, or sculpture. PA.
138.

See PA.

STAT.

STAT. ANN.

ANN. tit. 73, § 2102 (Purdon Supp. 1988).

tit. 73, § 2107(3) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra note 61

and accompanying text (discussing this exclusion under the California statute). However, California's statutory definition of "commercial use" narrowly limits the exclusion in that state.
See supra note 61.
139. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2107(3) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
140. Id. § 2106; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the determination of "recognized quality" under the California statute); supra note 93 and accompanying
text (same under the Massachusetts statute). Although implicit in both the California and
Massachusetts statutes, Pennsylvania specifically provides that the issue of recognized quality
is to be determined by "a preponderance of the evidence." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2106
(Purdon Supp. 1988).
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struction of a work of fine art."" Similarly, the Pennsylvania prohibition does not apply to an artist who created, owns, and possesses

the work.14 2 Pennsylvania tracks the California statute's provision relating to physical damage caused by the gross negligence of framers,

conservers, and restorers of fine art 143 and provides a similar definition of gross negligence: a degree of care so slight "as to justify the
belief that a person acted with indifference toward the physical integrity of a work of fine art.' ' 4 4 Unlike the Massachusetts statute,
however, the Pennsylvania statute does not apply the gross negli4
gence standard to the public at large.1 6

The provisions with respect to removal of fine art from buildings
where such removal cannot be accomplished without substantive
physical injury or alteration are, for the most part, the same as those
in California and Massachusetts. 44 However, two important differences exist. As in both California and Massachusetts, the exemption
from coverage for fine art that cannot be removed from a building
without substantial physical defacement, alteration, mutilation or destruction may be waived if such waiver is contained in a written instrument signed by the building owner.' 47 However, there is no requirement that the instrument be recorded.'

48

Nevertheless, the

waiver "shall be binding on subsequent owners of the building."' 49
This implicitly amends the recording statutes in Pennsylvania so as
to provide for an effective encumbrance on title without recording,
141. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra note 64
and accompanying text (discussing the basic prohibition of the California statute); supra note
97 and accompanying text (same under the Massachusetts statute).
142. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra note 64
and accompanying text (noting the analogous exemption under the California statute); supra
note 97 and accompanying text (same under the Massachusetts statute).
143. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra notes
65-69 and accompanying text (discussing this provision of the California statute).
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104(c) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra note 69
(discussing the definition of "gross negligence" under the California statute).
145. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (noting the broader application of
the Massachusetts gross negligence standard).
146. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2108(a), (b) (Purdon Supp 1988); see also supra
notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the corresponding provisions of the California
statute); supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (same under the Massachusetts statute).
147. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2108(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also supra note 71
and accompanying text (discussing the analogous California provision); supra note 102 and
accompanying text (same under the Massachusetts statute).
148. Cf. supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (noting the recording requirement
under the California statute); supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (same under the
Massachusetts statute).
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2108(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
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and thus, priority. Second, building owners are wholly exempted for
"emergency situations" where there is "no opportunity" to provide
proper notice to the artist. 150 This protection applies regardless of a
prior waiver by the building owner. 151
The artist at all times retains the right to claim or disclaim authorship.1 52 Rather than condition the right of disclaimer on "just
and valid reason" as does California and Massachusetts, Pennsylvania expressly provides that the right to disclaim authorship arises
whenever intentional physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or
destruction occurs. 53
In the event of a violation the artist is given the right to commence an action for injunctive relief, 5 actual damages,' 55 punitive
damages, 15' reasonable attorneys' and expert witness fees, 5 7 and any
other proper relief. 55 The right created by the statute endures for
the life of the artist plus fifty years 59 and may, in the event of his
death, be exercised by his heir, legatee, or personal representative. 6 0
There is no provision for an action by the attorney general or artists'
unions or other organizations designated by the artist, as there is in
Massachusetts.' 6' The statute of limitations period is three years
from a violation of the statute or one year from discovery, whichever
is longer.' 62 The artist may waive any of his rights so long as it is
16 3
done in a writing signed by him.
In a stark departure from the California and Massachusetts
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. § 2108(d).
Id.
Id. § 2103.
See id.; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the "just and

valid reason" requirement of the California statute); supra notes 105-07 and accompanying
text (same under the Massachusetts statute). Changes resulting from the gross negligence of
restorers, framers, or conservers would also give rise to the disclaimer right. See Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 73, § 2103 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2105(1) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
155. Id. § 2105(2).

156. Id. § 2105(3). As in California, punitive damages are not awarded to the plaintiff.
See supra note 82. Rather, they are awarded to an organization engaged in charitable or
educational activities involving the fine arts in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2105(3)
(Purdon Supp. 1988). The organization is selected by the trial judge in the exercise of his
discretion. See id.
157. PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 73, § 2105(4) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
158. Id. § 2105(5).
159. Id. § 2107(l).
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 108, 114 and accompanying text.
162. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2109 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
163. Id. § 2107(2).
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statutes, the Pennsylvania act provides that it "shall apply only to
works of fine art displayed in a place within [the] Commonwealth
accessible to the public."'"" It further defines "display" to mean exhibition "in a manner customarily considered to be appropriate for a
work of fine art in the particular medium. ' 16 5 This provision effectively converts the law from one prohibiting defacement to one
prohibiting display of a defaced work, a variant of the five remaining
state moral rights statutes, albeit without any need to show those
states' statutory elements of harm to the artist's reputation and display of the work as that of the artist.
E. Louisiana
Like Pennsylvania, Louisiana has adopted a public display
law' 6 that incorporates a "recognized quality" standard.'6 7 Unlike
Pennsylvania, however, prohibited displays are tied to the likelihood
of reputational harm, as in New York and New Jersey. 6 8 The definition of fine art is broad, including "any original work of visual or
graphic art of recognized quality." 69 The definition contains several
non-limiting examples

70

and expressly excludes "sequential imagery

such as motion pictures."' 1' "Recognized quality" is itself defined as
"those attributes of a work of fine art that enhance its value."'1 2 The
trier of fact is left to determine "whether or not these attributes exist" and is instructed to base its determination on the opinions of the
same gang of industry experts set forth in the statutes of other "rec164. Id. § 2110(a).
165. Id. § 2102.
166. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153 (West 1987); see also supra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text (discussing the display provisions of the Pennsylvania statute). The Louisiana statute provides that "no person other than the artist.., shall knowingly display to others,
make accessible to the public, or publish" works of fine art or reproductions "in an altered,
defaced, mutilated, or modified form," LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(1), (2) (West 1987),
and no person may display a work if damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to
result, id. § 51:2153(3).
167. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(4) (West 1987); see also supra notes 136, 140
and accompanying text (discussing Pennsylvania's "recognized quality" standard).
168. See LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(3) (West 1987), discussed supra note 166; see
also infra note 200 and accompanying text (noting analogous provisions under the New York
statute); infra note 219 and accompanying text (same under the New Jersey statute).
169. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7) (West 1987).
170. See id. The examples provided include "painting, drawing, print, photographic
print, or sculpture of a limited edition of no more than three hundred copies .... " Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.§ 51:2152(4).
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ognized quality" states.7 3 This creates a hopelessly circular quandary--"fine art" must satisfy the "recognized quality" standard, yet
the definition of recognized quality presupposes fine art since it identifies "recognized quality" as an attribute of fine art. This resolves
nothing and makes it extremely difficult to identify the subject matter governed by the statute.
The protections provided are tied to the knowing "display to
others" of fine art in an altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified
form.' 7 However, it is not clear from the language and structure of
the statute if likelihood of reputational harm is an element of the
prohibited conduct. The relevant section of the statute, section 2153,
is divided into three subsections. The first and second subsections
address "works of fine art"'7 5 and "reproductions,"' 7 respectively,
and appear to prohibit their display if they are in an altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified form. The third subsection prohibits
displays of both originals and reproductions when the work is "generally regarded by the public as that of the artist, or under circumstances in which it would be reasonably regarded as being the work
of the artist, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably
likely to result therefrom.' ' 7 7 The difficult question is whether the
subsections are independent prohibitions or whether the prohibitions
on the display of altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified works of
fine art and reproductions are further conditioned on the public identification of the works as being those of a particular artist and on the
likelihood of reputational harm.
If the three subsections are wholly independent, then the public
display of unaltered and carefully maintained works of fine art is
prohibited if a particular artist is identified in the public's mind as
the creator and the display is reasonably likely to harm his reputation. This conclusion results from the absence of any reference to
alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification in the third subsection of section 2153. Such a construction is patently absurd, since
it would have nothing to do with the display of a deformed work of
173. Id; see supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the determination of "recognized quality" under the California statute); supra note 94 and accompanying text (same
under the Massachusetts statute); supra note 140 and accompanying text (same under the

Pennsylvania statute).
174. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(1) (West 1987). Publication of such works and/or
making them accessible to the public are also prohibited. Id.
175. Id. § 51:2153(l).
176. Id. § 51:2153(2).
177. Id. § 51:2153(3).
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fine art. The chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment liberties would be overwhelming. Poor draftsmanship has clouded this
section of the act. Most of the other states adopting public display
statutes tie protection to public identification of an altered, defaced,
mutilated, or modified work as that of the artist and to a reasonable
likelihood of reputational harm. 17 8 Indeed, the section of the Louisiana statute that addresses disclaimers of authorship by artists requires a nexus between unauthorized alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification and actual or reasonably likely damage to the
artist's reputation. 17 9 With this in mind, the most reasonable construction of section 2153 is one in which the third subsection, requiring public identification of the work as that of the artist and likelihood of reputational harm, conditions the two preceding subsections,
which prohibit the display of altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified
works of fine art and reproductions.
Artists may claim, 80 or, for just and valid cause, disclaim,' 8 1
authorship of their works of fine art. This includes the right to have
one's name appear as the artist "on or in connection with the
work."' 82 Just and valid cause such as to warrant a disclaimer of
authorship requires an unauthorized physical change and the likelihood of reputational injury. 8 3
Works created under contract for advertising or trade use are
excluded from coverage unless the parties' written agreement provides otherwise.8 Conservation and restoration will not give rise to
any liability unless a physical change is produced which results from
the conserver's or restorer's negligence.'8 5 As elsewhere, changes resulting from the passage of time or from the inherent nature of the
materials used will not, in and of themselves, provide a basis for
178. See infra note 200 and accompanying text (New York); infra note 219 and accompanying text (New Jersey); infra note 266 and accompanying text (Maine). The exception is
Pennsylvania, which modeled its statute on California's "recognized quality" statute, see supra
note 140 and accompanying text, and then added a provision limiting the applicability of the
statute to works of fine art displayed in a place within Pennsylvania that is accessible to the
public, see supra note 164 and accompanying text. That stands in stark contrast to the Louisiana statute, which is similar in structure to the other "display" states.
179. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154C (West 1987).
180. Id. § 51:2154B.
181. Id. § 51:5154C.
182. Id. § 51:5154B.
183. Id. § 51:5154C.
184. Id. § 51:2155D.
185. Id. § 51:2155C.
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liability.1 86
Provisions relating to the removal of fine art which is located
within or forms a part of a building are similar to those in California
and Massachusetts. 5 7
An aggrieved artist may sue for legal and injunctive relief. 188
Such actions must be commenced within three years from the date
of the act complained of or one year from "actual or constructive
discovery of such act," whichever is longer. 189 Since only the artist
may commence suit, 90 the duration of protection is implicitly limited to the life of the artist. Furthermore, it is clear that the artist
may waive his rights since the necessary element of public display
must occur without the artist's consent.'
F. New York
New York defines a work of fine art in narrow terms: "painting,
sculpture, drawing, or work of graphic art, and print, but not multiples."' 9 2 This is similar in approach to California's limitation on recognized media, but fundamentally differs from California, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana in its universality within the
given media; that is, there is no "recognized quality" requirement. 93
However, the conduct prohibited in relation to the work creates substantial limitations on the statute's applicability 9 4 which can only be
determined on a case by case basis. The act of physical defacement,
committed intentionally, negligently, or otherwise, is not necessarily
prohibited. 95 As in Pennsylvania, it is the public display of fine art
in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form that is prohibited. 9' Similarly, the publication or reproduction of such altered
186. See id.§ 51:2155A.
187. See id. § 51:2155F(I), (2); see also supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous California provision); supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (same
under the Massachusetts statute).
188. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2156A (West 1987).
189. Id. § 51:2156B.
190. See id.§ 51:2156A.
191. See id.§ 51:2153.
192. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01.9 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
193. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting the "recognized quality" requirement of the California statute); supra note 89 and accompanying text (same under the Massachusetts statute); supra note 136 and accompanying text (same under the Pennsylvania statute); supra note 167 and accompanying text (same under the Louisiana statute).
194. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
195. See id. § 14.03(3)(a)-(c) (describing those acts of alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification which do not constitute a violation of § 14.03(1)).
196. See id.§ 14.03(3)(e); see also supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discuss-
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works is also prohibited. 197 The statute applies only where the public
display was knowingly made.1 98 Furthermore, the prohibition is conditioned on two important evidentiary conclusions: (1) the work must
be displayed, published, or reproduced "as being the work of the artist" (or under circumstances in which the displayed work could reasonably be regarded as that of the artist), 199 and (2) it must be reasonably likely that the artist's reputation will be damaged as a
result.2 00
Artists may claim, and, for just and valid reason, disclaim, authorship of their works.2 0 ' Just and valid reason exists when the work
has been publicly displayed in an altered, defaced, mutilated, or
modified form without the artist's consent.20 2 While there is no need
to establish how the physical change occurred or whether it was the
result of intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct or an act of God,
the artist must establish that the transformation is reasonably likely
to result or has resulted in damage to his reputation in order to disclaim authorship.20 8 Changes occurring to a work "resulting from
the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials," unless
occasioned by gross negligence in maintaining or protecting the
work, do not alone give rise to a claim of alteration or the right to
disclaim authorship. 0 4 Similarly, changes which ordinarily occur in
a given process of reproduction will not alone constitute an actionable change or give rise to the right to disclaim authorship. 20 5 The
statute also provides that any act which fits within the statutory definition of "conservation" "shall not constitute an alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification" 206 unless such work is performed
20 7
negligently.
As in Pennsylvania, the statute does "not apply to work preing the analogous provision in the Pennsylvania statute). It should be noted, however, that
Pennsylvania still requires the transforming conduct to be intentional. See supra note 141 and

accompanying text.
197. See N.Y. ARTs & CuLT. AFF.LAW § 14.03(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 14.03(l).
200. Id.
201. Id. § 14.03(2)(a).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 14.03(3)(a).
205. Id. § 14.03(3)(b).
206. Id. § 14.03(3)(c). "Conservation" is defined as "acts taken to correct deterioration
and alteration and acts taken to prevent, stop or retard deterioration." Id. § 11.01.7.
207. Id. § 14.03(3)(c).
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pared under contract for advertising or trade use unless the contract
so provides."2 " The statute provides that the aggrieved artist "shall
have a cause of action for legal and injunctive relief" 209 but makes
no further provision as to the types of remedies available. While no
mention is made of the duration of the rights created, they must
necessarily lapse at the artist's death since there is no provision for
any person other than the artist to commence an action in the event
of a violation.
The statute of limitations is three years from the act complained
210
of or one year from "constructive discovery," whichever is longer.
Since it is not a violation to display a mutilated work with the artist's consent, 211 and since only the artist may commence suit in the
event of a violation,21 2 it is clear that the protections of the statute
may be waived by the artist.
G. New Jersey
New Jersey broadly defines "fine art" to include "any original
work of visual or graphic art in any medium. ' 21 3 There is no "recognized quality" requirement. Non-limiting examples of various media
are set forth 214 and expressly include limited editions of no more
than three hundred copies.21 5 Expressly exempted from the statute is
"sequential imagery," such as motion pictures. 216 The New Jersey
statute also echoes the common exclusion for work "prepared under
contract for advertising or trade use unless the contract so provides." 217 As in New York, this seemingly broad definition may be
significantly curtailed by other provisions relating to the display of
such works that have been mutilated, altered, or defaced.21 8 Under
this statute, an artist must establish that the work, having been altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified, was then knowingly displayed
208. Id. § 14.03(3)(d); see supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (discussing the
analogous provision in the Pennsylvania statute).
209. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
210. Id. § 14.04(b).
211. See id. § 14.03(1).

212. Id. § 14.03(4)(a).
213. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3e (West 1987).
214. See id. The examples set forth in the statute include "paintings, drawings, prints,

and photographic prints or sculptures of a limited edition of no more than 300 copies .... Id.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.;
see supra note 214.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3e (West 1987).
Id. § 2A:24A-7.
See id. § 2A:24A-4; see also supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text (discuss-

ing the analogous New York provisions).
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in a place accessible to the public as the work of the artist and that
damage to his reputation is reasonably likely to result.2 19 This is a
more difficult evidentiary burden than the New York statute, since
New York prohibits display under circumstances in which it is reasonable to regard the work as being that of the artist, 20 whereas
New Jersey requires that the work in fact be displayed as that of the
artist. 22 Similar prohibitions exist for publication and reproduction
of altered fine art.22 Such publication or reproduction must not only
be reasonably likely to damage the artist's reputation, 2 ' but must
also be published or reproduced as being the work of the artist by
actually using the name of the artist in conjunction with the publication or reproduction. 2
The artist's right to claim authorship is protected, 225 as is his
right, for just and valid cause, to disclaim authorship. 22 "Just and
valid cause" is defined to include the alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification of the work, by someone other than the artist,
without the artist's consent. 27 In addition, there must be proof that
the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to be or has been damaged 228 and that the work was "knowingly displayed in a place accessible to the public or published or reproduced in [New
Jersey].''229 With respect to physical changes in the work resulting

from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials
used, 230 and changes ordinarily occurring in a particular medium of
reproduction2 3 ' or through conservation efforts,23 2 the relevant provisions in New Jersey's statute are precisely the same as the New
York statute.23
As in New York, the statute provides that an "aggrieved artist"
219. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4 (West 1987).
220. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
221. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4 (West 1987).
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. § 2A:24A-5.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. § 2A:24A-7.
230. See id. § 2A:24A-6(a).
231. See id. § 2A:24A-6(b).
232. See id. § 2A:24A-6(c).
233. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous provisions
of the New York statute).
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' Similarly,
has a cause of action for "legal and injunctive relief."234
there is no further elaboration of the remedies available. Moreover,
the rights and obligations created by the statute presumably dissolve
upon the artist's death since no provision exists to the contrary. The
statute of limitations, however, is considerably longer than New
York's-six years from the act complained of or two years from
"constructive discovery," whichever is longer.235 As in New York,
the statutory language permits an offending display whenever the
artist consents, effectively writing a waiver clause into the statute. 236
Similarly, the artist's consent to the defacement, alteration, mutilation, or modification appears to waive his right to disclaim
authorship.237

H. Rhode Island
Rhode Island's definition of "fine art" is the same as New
Jersey's, 8 including within its scope any original work of visual or
graphic art 239 and limited edition multiples of no more than three
hundred copies,2 40 and expressly excluding "sequential imagery such
as that in motion pictures. '241 As typical with other "display" laws,
there is no "recognized quality" requirement. 4 2 The statute also
adapts New Jersey's language excluding "work prepared under contract for advertising or trade use unless the contract so provides. ' 24 3
As in New York and New Jersey, the provisions governing display of
such works in an altered condition may dramatically affect the stat234.

See N.J.

STAT.

ANN. § 2A:24A-8(a) (West 1987); see also supra note 209 and

accompanying text (discussing the remedies provided by the New York statute).
235. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
accompanying text (discussing the
236. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
accompanying text (discussing the

237. See NJ.
238.

STAT.

2A:24A-8(b) (West 1987); see also supra note 210 and
New York three-year/one-year statute of limitations).
2A:24A-4 (West 1987); see also supra notes 211-12 and
effective waiver under the New York statute).

ANN. § 2A:24A-5 (West 1987).

See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey's statutory

definition of "fine art").
239. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2(e) (1987).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (noting the absence of a "recognized
quality" requirement in the New York statute); supra note 213 and accompanying text (same
under the New Jersey statute). But see supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting the
"recognized quality" requirement in the Pennsylvania statute); supra note 167 and accompanying text (same under the Louisiana statute).
243. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-5(d) (1987); see supra note 217 and accompanying text
(discussing the analogous exclusion under the New Jersey statute).
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ute's impact.244 The Rhode Island statute prohibits anyone but the
artist or a person acting with his consent from knowingly displaying
an altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified work of fine art in a public exhibition. 2 " The statute also prohibits publication or reproduction of such altered fine art.2 " In all cases, however, the work must
be displayed, published, or reproduced as being that of the artist or,
as similarly required in New York, "under circumstances under
which it would reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist."'2 47 Unlike New York or New Jersey, but more in line with
Pennsylvania, there is no requirement that such display, publication,
or reproduction be reasonably likely to damage or in any other way
affect the reputation of the artist.248 This is particularly surprising
since Rhode Island does not follow the Pennsylvania requirement of
recognized quality.249 It is even more surprising in view of the artist's paternity right in Rhode Island, which entitles the artist to
claim, or for just and valid reason, disclaim, authorship of his
work. 50 Just and valid reason includes, as in New York and New
Jersey, that the work has been altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified by someone other than the artist, and without the artist's consent.25 ' In addition, the statute requires that the work be knowingly
displayed in a place accessible to the public within Rhode Island or
is published or reproduced in the state.252 Furthermore, a just and
valid reason to disclaim authorship requires a showing that damage
to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result or has resuited.253 While necessary to disclaim authorship, that requirement
is not applicable to the substantive prohibition on the display, publi244. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous New
York provisions); supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text (same under the New Jersey

statute).
245. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3 (1987).
246. See id.
247. Id.; see supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous New

York provision).
248. Cf. supra note 200 and accompanying text (noting the reputational injury requirement of the New York statute); supra note 219 and accompanying text (same under the New
Jersey statute).
249. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting Pennsylvania's "recognized
quality" requirement).
250. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-4 (1987).
251. Id.; see supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous New
York provision); supra note 227 and accompanying text (same under the New Jersey statute).
252. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-5(e) (1987).
253. Id. § 5-62-4.
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cation, or reproduction of altered fine art."'
The provisions applicable to changes resulting from the passage
of time or the inherent nature of the materials used, 55 and changes
ordinarily resulting from a particular method of reproduction25 6 or
258
through conservation efforts, 257 are the same as New York's.
In the event of a violation of the statute, the aggrieved artist
"shall have a cause of action for legal and injunctive relief. 2 59 As in
New York and New Jersey, the right appears to terminate on the
artist's death since only the artist is given the right to commence
suit. 260 Furthermore, again in accordance with the New York and
New Jersey statutes, the artist may consent to offending displays or
alteration, and thereby waive the rights created under the statute.26'
The statute of limitations is three years from the act complained of
or one year from "constructive discovery," whichever is longer.262
I. Maine
A work of fine art under the Maine statute includes any original
work of visual or graphic art except sequential imagery, thereby excluding motion pictures. 263 Limited edition multiples of no more than
264
three hundred copies are also included in the statutory definition.
The statute prohibits the knowing nonconsensual display of altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified works in places accessible to
the public, provided the work is displayed as that of the artist 265 and
such display is reasonably likely to damage the artist's reputation.266
As in the other public display statutes, the applicable prohibitions
254.
255.
256.
257.

See
See
See
See

id. §
id. §
id. §
id. §

5-62-3.
5-62-5(a).
5-62-5(b).
5-62-5(c).

258. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous provisions
in the New York statute).
259. RI. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-6(a) (1987).
260. See id.; see also supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous
provision of the New York statute); supra note 234 and accompanying text (same under the
New Jersey statute).
261. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-3 to -4 (1987); see also supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing the analogous New York provision); supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (same under the New Jersey statute).
262. R I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-6(b) (1987).
263. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(1)(D) (1988).
264. Id.

265. Id. § 303.2. This condition is satisfied if the work is displayed "under circumstances
under which it would reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist." Id.
266. Id.
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extend to publication or reproduction of the work.267 In all cases, the
display, publication, or reproduction must occur within the State of
'
2 68
Maine.
Artists at all times retain the right to claim or, for just and
valid reason, to disclaim, authorship of their works of fine art.269 Just
and valid cause justifying such a disclaimer includes nonconsensual
alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification of the work which
is reasonably likely to or has resulted in damage to the artist's
reputation.
The statute excludes works "prepared under contract for advertising or trade use, unless the contract so provides. ' '271 Conservation
efforts are protected unless performed in a grossly negligent manner.272 Changes resulting from the passage of time or the inherent
nature of the materials used are also excluded from the reach of the
statute unless the changes are the "result of gross negligence in
maintaining or protecting the work. '2 73 Furthermore, changes which
medium of reproduction are beordinarily result from a particular
274
statute.
the
of
scope
yond the
In the event of a violation of the statute, an aggrieved artist is
entitled to legal and injunctive relief.276 Injunctive relief is limited to
the claiming or disclaiming of authorship as described above.2 7 6
There are no provisions for attorneys' fees, costs, or punitive damages. Actions brought under the act must be commenced "within 3
years of the act complained of or one year after the artist or his
reasonably should have discovpersonal representative discovered or
277
longer.
is
whichever
act,
ered the
There is no provision limiting the duration of protection. It
would appear that the artist's personal representative may com267. See id.; see also supra note 166 (noting the applicability of the Louisiana statute to
instances of publication and reproduction); supra note 197 and accompanying text (same
under the New York statute); supra note 222 and accompanying text (same under the New
Jersey statute); supra note 246 and accompanying text (same under the Rhode Island statute).
268. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(4) (1988).
269. Id. § 303(3). The right to claim or disclaim authorship means that the artist may
"have his name appear on or in connection with" his work or "prevent his name from appearing on or in connection with" his work. Id.
270. Id.

271.

Id. § 303(4).

272.

See id.

273.

Id.

274.

Id. § 303(4)(B).

275. Id.

§ 303(4)(A).
§ 303(5).

276. See id.; see also supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
277. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(5) (1988).
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mence suit at any time after the artist's death so long as the time
limits relating to the commencement of suit following discovery of
the act complained of are satisfied. No other state having adopted
similar legislation provides, either expressly or implicitly, such an
unlimited duration of protection. Finally, it is clear that the artist
may waive his rights since the public display element of the statute's
provisions must occur without the artist's consent. 8
IV.

PREEMPTION

The significance of the state statutes will depend on the extent,
if any, of federal copyright preemption. Section 301 of the federal
Copyright Act of 1976 is the basis for federal preemption of state
common law and statutory provisions which purport to create rights
with respect to federal copyrightable subject matter.27 9 Section
301(a) provides, in part:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103 ... are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State. 80
Section 301(b) expressly exempts from preemption:
any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any
State with respect to(1) subject matter that does not come within ... sections 102
and 103

...

;or

(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright or specified by section 106 .... 21
Any inquiry concerning preemption of the various state artists' rights
statutes must therefore focus on the two prong test set forth in section 301; namely, is the subject matter addressed by the state stat278.
279.
280.
281.

See id. § 303(2).
See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
Id. § 301(a).
Id. § 301(b).
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utes included within the scope of sections 10282 or 103283 and, if so,

are the rights created "equivalent" to any of the exclusive rights
enumerated in section 106?284

A. Subject Matter
Section 102 includes within the scope of copyrightable subject
matter all "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."28 5 While section 102
sets forth seven illustrative categories of copyrightable subject matter,286 they are not exclusive and merely set forth "the general area
of copyrightable subject matter ...

with sufficient flexibility to free

the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope of particular
categories. ' '2sV Indeed, Congress has recognized that "[a]uthors are
continually finding new ways of expressing themselves... [and that]
it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take."288 Accordingly, the "two fundamental criteria" of
federal copyright subject matter are "originality and fixation in tangible form." 2 9
In each of the nine states adopting moral rights legislation, the
subject matter within the ambit of the acts is "fine art," defined in a
number of ways. Some states include any original work of visual or
graphic art in any medium, 90 while others specify the media.291 In
282. See id. § 102 (regulating the subject matter of copyright in general).
283. See id. § 103 (regulating the subject matter of copyright in compilations and derivative works).
284. See id. § 106(l)-(5); see also 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 13, §
8.21[C][21, [3], at 8-255 (examining potential preemption of both the California and New

York statutes).
285.

17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).

286. See id. Section 102 provides the following categories of works of authorship: "(1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works,
including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographics works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound
recordings." Id.
287. H.R. REP.No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.

& ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5666.
288. Id. at 51, reprinted in 1976 US. CODE

CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5664.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (Massachusetts); supra notes
135-36 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania); supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text
(Louisiana); supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (New Jersey); supra notes 238-41 and
accompanying text (Rhode Island); supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text (Maine).
291. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text (California); supra note 118 and
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each case, however, the work is necessarily one that is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. The language of the basic provisions
of the state statutes deals with physical defacement, alteration, mutilation, or destruction of the work or its public display after it has
been altered, mutilated, or modified. In either case, physical change
is a necessary prerequisite, thereby assuming fixation in a tangible
medium. As noted by Professor Nimmer, the California Art Preservation Act 292 employs the term "original" in the definition of fine art
in its copyright sense, which is to denote creation and conceptual
origin. 9a The same use of the term "original" occurs in each state's
definition of "fine art ' 2 94 except Connecticut. 95 Since the state statutes incorporate the same two criteria for subject matter as the federal copyright act (originality and fixation in a tangible form), it is
clear that the subject matter addressed therein is included within the
scope of section 102. Therefore, the state acts are prime candidates
for preemption if the rights created are "equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106. ' ' 298
B.

Equivalency

Section 106 provides that the copyright owner has the exclusive
right to: (1) reproduce the copyrighted work,29 7 (2) prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work, 98 (3) publicly distribute the copyrighted work 2 99 (4) publicly perform the copyrighted
accompanying text (Connecticut); supra note 192 and accompanying text (New York).
292. CAL CIv. CODE §§ 987, 989 (West Supp. 1989), discussed supra notes 60-87 and
accompanying text.
293.

2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.21[C][2], at 8-257 n.34.3.

294. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (California); supra note 89 and accompanying text (Massachusetts); supra note 136 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania); supra
note 169 and accompanying text (Louisiana); supra note 192 and accompanying text (New
York); supra note 213 and accompanying text (New Jersey); supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text (Rhode Island); supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text (Maine).
295. By defining fine art as "any drawing, painting, sculpture" or similar work, 1988
Conn. Acts 284, § 1(2) (Reg. Sess.), Connecticut reaches works fixed in a tangible form,
whether original or not. To the extent the definition encompasses material outside the scope of
federal copyright subject matter (e.g. non-original works of fine art), the preemption issue does
not arise. Accordingly, if federal law preempts the Connecticut statute, it does so only to the
extent it addresses original works. The irony is that Connecticut may well have more securely
protected non-original works and knock-offs than original and presumably more deserving
works.
296. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1982).
297. Id. § 106(1).
298. Id. § 106(2).
299. Id.§ 106(3). Public distribution may be "by sale or other transfer of ownership, or

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1989

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:317

work,300 and (5) publicly display the copyrighted work.3 0'
If preemption of the state statutes is to be found under section

301, it would arise from the exclusive right granted by section
106(2) to the copyright owner to make a derivative copy of the work.
In the so-called "display" states, 02 preemption may also arise from
the exclusive rights granted by section 106 to reproduce, publish,
perform, and display the work.303
The determination of whether the new statutorily created state

rights are the equivalent of any of these section 106 rights requires
an examination of the meaning of the terms "alter," "mutilate,"
"deface," "modify," and "destroy" as they are used in the state statutes and the terms "derivative work," "publish," "display," and
"perform" as they are defined in section 101 of the Copyright Act. °4
Each of the terms used in the state statutes have separate and

distinct meanings. Thus, "alter" has a different meaning than "deface," and the same is true of "mutilate" and "destroy." In determining the meaning of the words used by the various legislatures,
the general rule of statutory construction is to apply the plain or
common meaning of those terms. 0 5 This is entirely satisfactory for
the present inquiry since each term has a distinct meaning. "Altera-

tion" is the "act or result of altering," which itself means "to
change."308 6 "Mutilate," in one context, means "to deprive ...

of a

by rental, lease, or lending." Id.
300. Id. § 106(4). The right to perform applies to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works." Id.
301. Id. § 106(5). The right to display applies to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work." Id.
302. See supra notes 135-278 and accompanying text (discussing the "display" statutes
of Pennsylvania, Louisiana, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Maine).
303. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3)-(5) (1982).
304. See id. § 101.
305. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 7374 (rev. 4th ed. 1984) (discussing the development of the plain meaning rule). Sutherland
argues that the plain meaning rule of statutory construction "coincides with a high degree of
literalism in the Court's approach to the process of interpretation which emphasized the importance of the legislative text. A court may speak of the plain meaning of the language of an
act as being the best evidence of legislative intent." Id. at 74. But see Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 23
(1939) (noting that the plain meaning rule is a controversial one which excludes extrinsic
evidence as to the meaning of a statute since "a judge can have no assurance that the meaning
which the statute suggests to him is the meaning which it suggested to individuals acting upon
the statute, unless he has canvassed all of the possible interpretations of which the statutory
language is subject.").
306. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
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limb or essential part"307 and included in the primary definition of
the term is the synonym "maim."2'

08

"Deface" means "to mar or dis-

30 9

figure the face or surface of'
and "destroy" means "[t]o ruin utterly; consume; dissolve." 3 10 Finally, "modify" means "to make
somewhat different in form [or] character . "..."311
It thus becomes
clear that the state legislatures were employing those terms which
would reach the widest possible scope of physical change.
A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as ...[an] abridgement, condensation, or any other

3' 12
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
In order to constitute a derivative work, the adaptation must "incorporate [a] sufficient [amount] of the preexisting work" to constitute
an infringement of the reproduction or performance right. 313 The
physical destruction of a work cannot, therefore, result in a derivative work if destruction means the utter ruin of the original. Thus,
the prohibition of physical destruction in state law is not preempted
since it is not "equivalent" to the applicable exclusive right set out in
section 106.314 The prohibition on alteration of the work, however,
would appear to be the precise equivalent of the derivative work
right,31 5 and is therefore preempted.3 16 The remaining prohibitions
on physical defacement and mutilation are less clear.
"Defacement" denotes disfigurement or marring of the surface
and "mutilation" signifies maiming. Both evoke the spirit of vandalism and wantonness, and as used in the state acts imply evilness of
motive and design. Under such a construction, defacement and mutilation would include only changes resulting from physical acts intended to disfigure and maim rather than merely transform or adapt
the work. Thus, the sawing of an arm from The Mermaid in Copenhagen, which occurred in 1984,317 would constitute a "mutilation"
and arguably a "defacement," but not an "alteration" or its kindred

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 43

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

(Encyclopedic ed. 1982).

839.
335.
338.
818.

312. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.09[A], at 8-113.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
See supra note 306 and accompanying text (defining the term "alteration").
See 2 M. NIMMER & D. NiMMER, supra note 13, § 8.21 [C][2], at 8-261.
Denmark's Mermaid Loses Arm to Vandal, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1984, at A3, col.
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spirit, a "derivative work." This seems an entirely satisfactory resolution of the issue for the "recognized quality" states,"'8 save Pennsylvania with its additional display clause, 319 especially in light of the
alternative. As Professor Nimmer points out, any other interpretation of the statutory language "defacement" or "mutilation" would
compel the subjective aesthetic judgment of whether alteration constitutes defacement or mutilation.320 If such a construction is
adopted by the courts, then the defacement and mutilation prohibition would be preempted in the same way "alteration" is likely
preempted. 2 '
With respect to the so-called "display" states,322 different section 106 rights are implicated. These statutes seek to regulate the
right to publicly display, reproduce, and publish modified works.323
Here the prohibitions appear to be aimed directly at the section 106
exclusive rights of distribution, performance, and display. 32 4
Section 101 defines "display" as showing a copy of a work or
"in the case of a motion picture . . . show[ing] individual images

nonsequentially." ' 25 "Perform" is defined as "recit[ing], render[ing],

play[ing], danc[ing], or act[ing] ... or, in the case of a motion picture ... show[ing] its images in any sequence .".."326
"Publication"

is the distribution of the work to the public.3 7 In the display states,
it is precisely those activities which gives rise to the artist's cause of
action. They provide the artist with a veto over the exercise of exclusive rights granted by Congress to the copyright owner. Federal preemption in these states would appear complete, both as creating
rights essentially "equivalent" to section 106 exclusive rights and as
abrogations of those exclusive rights which diminish their economic
exploitability. A number of commentators have argued otherwise,
318. See supra notes 60-134 and accompanying text (discussing the "recognized quality" statutes of California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut).
319. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing the "display" provision
of the Pennsylvania statute).
320. See 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.21 [C][2], at 8-261.
321. Id. Nimmer expresses the hope that the courts construe the terms "defacement"
and "mutilation" by objective standards so as to avoid preemption. See id.
322. See supra notes 135-278 and accompanying text (discussing the "display" statutes
of Pennsylvania, Louisiana, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Maine).
323. See supra notes 135-278 and accompanying text (discussing the "display" statutes
of Pennsylvania, Louisiana, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Maine).
324. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(l), (3)-(5) (1982).
325. Id. § 101.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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suggesting that the state rights have additional elements making
them distinct from and non-equivalent to the section 106 rights. 28
While it is true that some courts have applied an "elements test" to
the analysis of section 301 preemption, 32 9 a wooden comparative
analysis of the elements of various rights or actions may be offensive
to the overriding purpose of section 301 and is seldom advanced.
Most of the courts applying the so-called "elements test" emphasize

that regardless of the existence of additional elements in a state-created right, they remain equivalent to section 106 rights unless those

additional elements are "qualitatively different" than those matters
regulated by section 106.330 As the House Report accompanying the

Copyright Act stated:
The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any
rights ... that are equivalent to copyright .... The declaration of
this principle ... is intended to be stated in the clearest and most
unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall
act preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federalprotection.331

Tests which fail to address this clear intention but focus instead on a
328. See, e.g., Engdahl, Moral Rights in State Statutes: A Comparison of the California Art PreservationAct and the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, 34 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 203, 238 (1987) (noting that the New York statute requires the artist to
show the element of "alteration," which the author argues is not part of the federal statute);
Davis, supra note 15, at 248-49 (commenting that one such extra element might be the state
statutes' protection of moral rights as opposed to federal copyright protection of economic
interests).
329. For a discussion of these cases, see Francione, The CaliforniaArt PreservationAct
and Federal Preemption by the 1976 Copyright Act-Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 31
COPYRIGHT L. SYmP. (ASCAP) 105, 130 (1984).
330. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 852
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis in original), af'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
331. H R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5746 (emphasis added). The legislative history also contains the following statement:
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories of
sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if it fails to
achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain ....
The preemption of rights under State law is complete with respect to any work
coming within the scope of the bill, even though the scope of exclusive rights given
the work under the bill is narrower than the scope of common law rights in the work
might have been.
Id. at 131, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5747.
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wooden analysis of the elements would result in intolerable state

meddling with section 106 rights. Statehouse drafters would need
only to graft a new element onto an otherwise equivalent right to
escape preemption under an overly rigid elements test.

32

One commentator has suggested that preemption need not rely
on section 301. 3 Drawing on the constitutional principal that preemption is unavoidable when the state right "stands as an obstacle to

the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives
of Congress,"334 he argues that actual conflict provides a basis for
preemption in the absence of equivalence, relying on the Supremacy
Clause 3 5 itself rather than section 301 of the 1976 Act.336 It is unclear, however, if any federal court would go beyond section 301-to
date, none have done so.
V.

DisCUSSION

In defining "fine art" some states include any visual or graphic
art, regardless of medium,3 3 7 which may include limited edition multiples of no more than three hundred copies. 3 Others include only
those forms specifically set forth in the statute, such as painting,
sculpture, drawing, or print.3 The fundamental distinction, however, is between those states which impose a "recognized quality"
332. See Francione, supra note 329, at 138-39.
333. See id. at 139. The commentator notes that if a state passed a law providing that
the exercise of a right granted by federal copyright law violates a state-created right, the statecreated right would be preempted "not because the state rights were equivalent to federal
rights, but because state rights conflicted directly with the federal rights." Id. (emphasis in
original).
334. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
335. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, cl.
2. The Supremacy Clause provides that "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." id.
336. See Francione, supra note 329, at 138-39; see also Note, supra note 43, at 526-27
(arguing that a state publicity action against the colorist of a black and white film is likely to
be preempted under the Supremacy Clause since the right of publicity clashes with the purpose of federal copyright law).
337. See, e.g., supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (Massachusetts); supra notes
135-36 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania); supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text
(Louisiana); supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (New Jersey); supra notes 238-41 and
accompanying text (Rhode Island); supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text (Maine).
338. See, e.g., supra note 215 and accompanying text (New Jersey); supra note 240 and
accompanying text (Rhode Island); supra note 264 and accompanying text (Maine).
339. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text (California); supra note 118 and
accompanying text (Connecticut); supra note 192 and accompanying text (New York).
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standard 340 and those states which do not.
One consequence of a recognized quality standard is the difficulty encountered in making such a determination. Although states
retain some independence in regulating copyrightable subject matter, 41 they do not escape Justice Holmes' warning in Bleistein v.
Donaldson LithographingCo.311 that "[it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law" to judge the quality of
artistic endeavor:
At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss

appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until
the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke.... At the other end, [protection] would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.343
The point is well illustrated by the reaction, both within and
without the artistic communities of the day, to Auguste Rodin's Balzac.3 " Seldom has the art world witnessed an uproar comparable to
that accompanying the unveiling of Balzac in 1898.
Critics and
much of the public ridiculed the statue as "an obese monstrosity,"
"a monstrous abortion," "a colossal foetus," and "an inconceivable
piece of folly."1346 Still others saw it as a "monument to insanity and
impotence," lacking even "the vulgar merit of being upright. '347 A
group of six young artists reportedly plotted to vandalize the Balzac
by knocking it off its pedestal. 4 In the eyes of one French journalist, the sculpture was proof "of the degree of mental aberration at
34 9
which we have arrived at the end of this our century."
Yet even as "the upholders of the status quo detested the Balzac ...

the avant garde admired it as a symbol of the freedom to

340. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text (California); supra note 89 and
accompanying text (Massachusetts); supra note 136 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania);
supra note 167 and accompanying text (Louisiana).
341. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1972) (stating that "[a]lthough
the Copyright Clause thus recognizes the potential benefits of a national system, it does not
indicate that all writings are of national interest or that state legislation is in all cases, unnecessary or precluded.").
342. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).

343. Id. at 251-52.
344. See F. GRUNFELD,
345.

RODIN

373-77 (1987).

See id.

346. Id. at 374.
347. Id.
348. Id.

349. Id.
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which they aspired. 3 50 Many sympathetic to Rodin's work touted its
qualities, referring to the figure as "powerful and magnificent,"
"trembling with passion and muscular energy, a block feverish with
life itself," and "the proudest and most intense expression of energy
ever realized by the art of the sculptor."13'5 The debate raged beyond
civility. The Committee of the Soci~t6 des Gens de Lettres, which
had commissioned the work, rejected it as a "rough model" and declined to recognize it as a statue of Balzac, 52 much less one of recognized quality.
The controversy over Balzac serves as a useful illustration of the
problems inherent in tying protection to work of "recognized quality." The crude attempt by the respective state legislatures to delegate the responsibility of determining "recognized quality" to the
trier of fact compounds the problem. All three "recognized quality"
statutes list the experts who "shall" be relied upon by the fact
finder.333 Yet none include art professors or art historians. Perhaps
professors may be included in the statutory term "other persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art." But that in itself
raises a problem common to that class of experts and to those described as "collectors of fine art." Both include the term "fine art"
as a part of the definition. Thus, collectors of something other than
fine art or persons included in the creation of something other than
fine art are not competent experts under the statute. Any expert offered on such a basis would be a prime target for challenge. Opposing parties may stipulate that such persons are collectors of art, but
not "fine art"-that is to say, not art of "recognized quality." Nor
does the inclusion of artists, curators of art museums, and art dealers
as experts solve the underlying problem illustrated by the example of
Rodin's Balzac, for it was the very categories of experts itemized in
the statutes that yielded the vicious dispute as to the merit of Balzac 354 The art world is not homogenous and has its own in-fighting.
Disputes are certain to occur. Yet each state adopting the recognized
quality standard directs that the trier of fact "shall rely" on the
350. Id.
351. Id. at 375-76.
352. Id. at 377.
353. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the determination of
"recognized quality" under the California statute); supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text
(same under the Massachusetts statute); supra note 140 and accompanying text (same under
the Pennsylvania statute); see also supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (same under the
Louisiana "display" statute).
354. See supra notes 344-52 and accompanying text.
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opinions of the experts. The statutes are drafted in mandatory terms.
They appear to exclude any other experts on the issue of recognized
quality. But it cannot be seriously maintained that the legislatures
intended to deny juries the ability to choose between conflicting expert opinions. Indeed, such choices are the essence of fact finding,
without which any dispute between experts would paralyze the judicial process. If we concede that juries are free to discount or disregard some experts in the face of the statutory language, then by all
reason, they should, in accordance with the general rule, be able to
accept all, some, or none of the expert opinion offered. Certainly no
responsible jurist would suggest that the fact finder is obliged to accept the credibility of a witness. If this is so, what is to be gained by
limiting the occupations of those qualified to testify as experts to the
issue of recognized quality rather than leaving the qualifications of
experts to the traditional tests of education, training, and
experience? 355
What all this points out is the likelihood of inconsistent verdicts
on the issue of what constitutes recognized quality. Therein lies the
paradox of such quality control-it may actually discourage vigorous
enforcement by the artist out of a well-founded fear that a particular
jury may decide that his work fails to meet a recognized quality
standard. Such a negative verdict could do more harm to the artist's
reputation than the physical defacement of his work.
States that do not impose such quality standards do not avoid
the tangle. Those states, with the exception of Connecticut, do not
prohibit the act of physical defacement, as do the recognized quality
states, but instead prohibit the knowing display of defaced works in
public. In Louisiana, New York, and Rhode Island, such display is
prohibited when the work is exhibited as that of the artist or under
circumstances under which it may be reasonably perceived as
such. 356 That condition may be evaded by a sufficiently conspicuous
disclaimer distinguishing the artist from the work in its altered
form.35 7 Louisiana, New York, New Jersey, and Maine also condi355. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth the traditional criteria for a
witness' qualification as an expert: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
356. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant Louisiana provision); supra note 199 and accompanying text (same under the New York statute); supra
note 247 and accompanying text (same under the Rhode Island statute).
357. One could debate what constitutes a "sufficiently conspicuous disclaimer," but the
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tion the prohibited conduct on a reasonable likelihood of damage to
the artist's reputation. 58 This second condition may be even more
difficult for the artist to prove. How does one establish reputational
damage? How is such damage quantified? If the artist's commercial
success is not hampered, where is the damage? If commercial success is in issue, as either a measure of damages or a reflection of
reputational harm, do the plaintiff-artist's financial records become
discoverable? Does a past devoid of commercial success weaken the
artist's case? Regardless of the standard by which it is measured,
requiring reasonable likelihood of reputational damage operates as a
significant disincentive to the artist by increasing the chance of a
negative verdict and potentially opening his prior commercial success
to dissection.
The problem lies in the failure of the state legislatures to give
adequate weight to the public interest in preserving its cultural heritage and placing too much emphasis on the artist's economic and
personal interests, thereby creating what amounts to a system of incentive and protection of questionable efficiency. Some of the states
do not even refer to a public interest in their legislative findings of
fact accompanying the acts. They focus solely on the interests of the
individual artist, his personality as reflected in his creation, and the
unfairness and prejudicial impact that may befall his professional
career in the absence of legislative protection.3 5 9 The three "recognized quality" states, on the other hand, each identify interests of
another sort. California's legislative findings of fact declare that in
addition to the state's concern for the artist, "there is also a public
interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations." 360 The Massachusetts statute contains an identical declaration 361 and the Pennsylvania legislature, in the statute's preamble,
states, in part:
The ongoing creation and preservation of fine art contributes
to the cultural enrichment and, therefore, general welfare of the
claim is nonetheless sound. If the disclaimer effectively separates the artist from the work, then
the statutory condition that the work be displayed as that "of the artist" cannot be satisfied.
358. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Louisiana statute);
supra note 200 and accompanying text (same under the New York statute); supra notes 219,
223 and accompanying text (same under the New Jersey statute); supra note 266 and accompanying text (same under the Maine statute).
359. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN, § 2A:24A-2
(West 1987); 1983 N.Y. LAWS 994.
360. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a) (West Supp. 1989).
361. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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public.
...In order to protect artists, and ultimately preserve art for
the benefit and enjoyment of the public, it is necessary to afford
artists certain legal rights and remedies in relation to their works of
fine art.362
It may be argued that focusing on the failure of some states to
explicitly recognize a paramount public interest, or any public interest for that matter, may obscure the implicit recognition of such an
interest in the very function of the statute. After all, the statutes
represent a certain legislative judgment about the relationship of incentive and creation which presupposes a broad societal interest in
the creation of fine art. Yet, creation is not synonymous with preservation and the lack of any express recognition of such a public interest seems to have translated into display laws tied directly to the
artist's economic interests. In other states, the express reference in
the legislative findings to a broad public interest in the preservation
of fine art must mean something, and its translation in the statutes
appears to be the trade-off between the requirement of recognized
quality, with all its inherent difficulties, and the prohibition against
the intentional physical act of defacement, mutilation, alteration,
and destruction. In other words, those statutes prohibit intentional
physical modification rather than knowing display, and, therefore,
more nearly approach an expression of public interest in preserving
the work itself and not merely the artist's exploitable interest.
Pennsylvania's departure from this scheme is inexplicable.
While shaping its statute on the California model, it makes a radical
change by adding a section which makes the act applicable only to
works of fine art on public display within Pennsylvania, thus effectively converting the Pennsylvania statute into a "display statute." '63
"Display" statutes, however, are primarily concerned with the artist's reputational interest and impose an element of real and demonstrable prejudicial impact generally taking the form of a requirement
that the display will be reasonably likely to cause injury.3864 A close
analogy exists with the Louisiana statute, a public display law with a
"recognized quality" requirement. 6 5 Unlike Pennsylvania, however,
362. PA. STAT. ANN. § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1988)
363. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of the Pennsylvania statute).
364. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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Louisiana also requires a reasonable likelihood of reputational
harm.36 6

Ultimately, all of the state statutes fail to protect the artist or
the public. Those artists with sufficient negotiating power (usually
those with established reputations) can obtain all desired protection
for their works by contract. The statute adds nothing to their stock.
It is the emerging talent, the unknown, the struggling, who are the

intended beneficiaries of the statute. They often lack the bargaining
leverage to demand contractual protection for their works' integrity
and their paternity rights. But it is the unknown talent who is most
vulnerable to the statutes' most subversive provision-the waiver.

The artist's ability to waive any and all of the protections under the
statutes undermine one of the central purposes for their adoption.
Whether one views the statutes as protecting artists alone or both
artists and the public, waiver is a dagger in the heart of the protec-

tion. If the intended beneficiary is the public, there is no justification
for waiver that rests within the discretion of the artist or his personal
representative. If the protections in the statute are designed solely

for the artist, how would prohibiting waiver damage or impinge on
any legitimate expectancy of the artist? It would be the rarest of

individuals who claimed his incentive to create fine art was stimulated by the knowledge that he may some day waive his right to

prohibit the work's physical defacement. 8 Presumably, an individual consciously endeavoring to create fine art is not concurrently
contemplating a grant to another to deface it. If there exists such

artists, how can law, consistent with reasoned justice, label their expectancy reasonable or legitimate?
One other provision is directly related to the interests protected
by the statutes. With the exception of Maine, all of the state statutes

provide protection for only a limited duration-some limited by in366. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
367. Adapting what one writer has commented about incentives in another context
(dealing with the duration of copyright), I suggest that the unknown artist, struggling in obscurity, "'would very much rather have ... twopence to buy a plate of shin of beef of a cook's
shop underground,'" than go to sleep hungry but content in the burning knowledge that he
may waive his right to prevent the defacement of his work. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of
Copyright (pt. 2), 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 720 (1945) (quoting 8 T. MACAULAY, WORKs 203
(G. Trevelyan ed. 1879)). If it can be shown "'that the prospect of this boon roused him to
any vigorous effort, or sustained his spirits under depressing circumstances,'" id. (quoting 8 T.
MACAULAY, WORKS 203 (G. Trevelyan ed. 1879)), or saw him pass up a handsome profit by
refusing to waive his statutory rights, I would gladly yield the debate. Certainly there are
artists tall on principle, who would not yield. But if the great mass be mortal men, waiver will
become a common thing.
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ference to the life of the artist, 368 others limited expressly to the artist's lifetime plus fifty years. 69 This would be a minor issue if the
artist's interests are the only concerns. But if there is a public interest-expressly recognized in some states, subsumed in the remainder-what purpose does limited duration serve? To protect this generation and perhaps the next? Can tradition and the cultural
heritage of a society take so short a view? How does the creator's
death diminish the public interest in preserving its cultural heritage?
Limited duration seems inconsistent with the interest of preservation.
Perpetual duration offends neither the artist nor the deeper public
interest. At best, this aspect of the state statutes represents a legislative compromise, at worst a lack of understanding and a worrisome
confusion over the purpose of the law.
In a recent article, one writer commented that the protection
offered in the state statutes is the preservation of the work's integrity
"even after the artist has sold the work and has no further economic
interest in it . .

,"3o This statement is typical of the romantic con-

fusion surrounding the statutes. Each state expressly premised its
statutes, in whole or in part, on the continuing economic relevance of
the physical condition of fine art on an artist's career. To suggest
that an artist has "no further economic interest" in his works of fine
art merely because the copyright and title have been transferred ignores much of the rationale behind the statutes. Some states also
express a public interest in preserving cultural heritage. No state has
ever adopted a law providing for the so-called moral right to control
the physical condition of one's work on the theory that art is not
property. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Despite
claims of elitists such as Richard Serra, art is property.3 ' Its exploitability as such is largely responsible for the richness of cultural
expression in our society, thereby attesting to the wisdom of the
368. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the duration of protection
under the Louisiana statute); supra note 209 and accompanying text (same under the New
York statute); supra note 234 and accompanying text (same under the New Jersey statute);
supra note 260 and accompanying text (same under the Rhode Island statute).
369. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the duration of protection
under the California statute); supra note 115 and accompanying text (same under the Massachusetts statute); supra note 132 and accompanying text (same under the Connecticut statute); supra note 159 and accompanying text (same under the Pennsylvania statute).
370. Kohs, Paint Your Wagon-Please!: Colorization, Copyright, and the Search for
Moral Rights, 40 FED. CoMm. L.J. 1, 27 (1988).
371. In his fight to prevent the removal of his Tilted Arc from Federal Plaza in New
York City, Mr. Serra recently commented, "The Government has to learn that art is not
property." Lacayo, The "Moral Rights" of Artists, TIME, Mar. 14, 1988, at 59.
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Framer's recognition of art and the fruits of other intellectual endeavor as property. Supplanting the competitive process and introducing a form of trade regulation will enrich artists, but not art.
In addition to the apparent confusion over purpose and design,
the multiplicity of these statutes and their adoption in states that are
traditional cultural and artistic centers raise concerns about the statutes' jurisdictional reach. Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey,
Rhode Island and Maine expressly limit the applicability of their
statutes to works located within the boundaries of the state. 72 While
the California, Massachusetts, and Connecticut statutes contain no
such provision, the limitation appears mandated by the Supreme
3 73
Court's decision in Goldstein v. California.
The Court in Goldstein upheld a state copyright law prohibiting record and tape
piracy, stating that "a copyright granted by a particular State has
effect only within its boundaries. If one State grants such protection,
the interests of States which do not are not prejudiced since their
citizens remain free to copy within their borders those works which
may be protected elsewhere. 3 74 Louisiana has attempted to circumvent the language of Goldstein by extending the applicability of its
statute not only to works displayed within the state but also "to acts
in violation of this chapter by a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of this state. 37 51 While this clever drafting appears to extend the
reach of the statute beyond Louisiana's state lines, it clearly intrudes
on the sovereignty of other states and is likely invalid unless Louisiana's courts interpret it to mean that, with respect to the prohibitions contained in the statute, the state's jurisdiction over persons
extends only so far as the state borders.
Accordingly, circumvention of any one statute may be accomplished by removal of a particular work to a jurisdiction without
moral rights legislation.3 76 Even removal from a "recognized quality" state to a "public display" state would have important consequences, both to the artist and to the owner of the work. It cannot be
reasonably anticipated that artists and art buyers will fully appreci372. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303.4 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-7
(West 1987); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988); PA. STAT.
ANN. § 21 10(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-5(e) (1987).
373. 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
374. Id. at 558.
375. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2155.E (West 1987).
376. Note that such removal may itself constitute an alteration, mutilation, or destruction of a work of fine art if the artist persuades the fact finder that the work was "sitespecific."
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ate the consequences of the interstate transportation of fine art.
VI.

CONCLUSION

To the extent this developing state statutory system of contrary
purpose and design is not preempted by federal copyright law, it has
left the protection of art treasures to artists. This in itself is a dangerous step on the path to totalitarian art.3 7 At the same time it
offers disincentives to enforcement and undervalues the public interest in the preservation of its cultural heritage. In enacting the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988,378 Congress passed on an
opportunity to unify the developing bodies of federal and state law.
It will now fall to the courts to resolve the conflicting claims of those
holding unlimited exclusive rights under a federal copyright and artists seeking vindication for physical alterations of their work. A reaffirmation of the economic philosophy of copyright and the
supremacy of section 106 of the Copyright Act would go a long way
in providing predictability and consistency in this area.

377. Stephen Weil, Deputy Director of the Hirshhorn Museum in Washington, D.C.,
commented on the current controversy aptly: "Should one generation of artists impose its taste
on history?" Lacayo, supra note 371, at 59.
378. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2853.
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